Discussant\u27s response to  Internal control: Progress and perils by Bailey, Andrew D.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Proceedings of the University of Kansas 
Symposium on Auditing Problems Deloitte Collection 
1-1-1992 
Discussant's response to "Internal control: Progress and perils" 
Andrew D. Bailey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Auditing Symposium XI: Proceedings of the 1992 Deloitte & Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on 
Auditing Problems, pp. 192-204; 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by an authorized 
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
Discussant's Response to "Internal Control: Progress 
and Perils" 
Andrew D. Bailey, Jr* 
University of  Arizona 
Introduction 
This comment is organized around the Winters and Guy paper and the COSO 
(Committee of  Sponsoring Organizations) Internal Control-Integrated 
Framework project [COSO, 1992; Winters and Guy, 1992], I was a member of 
the Project Advisory Council to COSO, Guidance and Oversight. This group 
included representatives from  each of  the COSO participating organizations, 
FEI (Financial Executive Institute), IIA (Institute of  Internal Auditors), IMA 
(Institute of  Management Accountants), AICPA (American Institute of  Certified 
Public Accountants), and AAA (American Accounting Association). As the 
AAA representative, I participated in all COSO Advisory Council deliberations. 
As is the habit of  the AAA, I was not authorized to speak for  the Association. 
The AAA Executive Committee recently endorsed the private sector initiative 
represented by the internal control framework  project, but did not endorse the 
specific  contents of  the report. Discussions with the AAA were still in progress 
when this paper was submitted. Any comments made by me concerning the 
results of  the framework  study are mine and not those of  the AAA or other 
COSO Advisory Council members. 
Background 
Some background, as I interpret it, on the evolution of  the COSO Internal 
Control project may be of  use. In developing the COSO response to the 
Treadway recommendations concerning an integrated definition  of  internal con-
trol, it was decided to develop the project within the existing FERF (Financial 
Executive Research Foundation) research framework.  The usual research 
process involves a task force,  such as the COSO Project Advisory Council, but 
drawn from  FEI members. Ordinarily a FERF project team is in direct charge of 
their project and accepts direction from  the task force  as it deems reasonable. It 
is the project team's option to reject advice and FERF's option to publish or not 
publish the resulting report. Given the nature of  this project and the perception 
by many that the internal control project was essential to providing a basis for 
potential legislation and/or regulation in the area, the COSO Advisory Council 
wanted to take a much more direct hand in setting direction for  the resulting 
report. The initial relations between the Coopers & Lybrand project team and 
The author wants to thank the members of  the COSO Advisory Council for  their valuable input on 
an earlier version of  this paper. Interpretations remain my own. 
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the COSO Advisory Council required some effort  due to these circumstances. 
The Coopers & Lybrand team, quite reasonably, considered all COSO Advisory 
Council input as just that — advisory. They chose to accept some, but certainly 
not all, of  the advice. The COSO Advisory Council found  this difficult  to deal 
with; however, an amicable set of  protocols was developed over time. 
Changed Project Management 
During this period, I believed that both the Coopers & Lybrand project team 
and the COSO Advisory Council anticipated that the final  product would be a 
FERF monograph. However, approximately halfway  through the effort  it was 
concluded that a more extensive public disclosure effort  than originally planned 
would enhance the possibility of  general acceptance of  the project results. 
Because of  the advocacy implications, FERF withdrew from  the management of 
the project. As a result, no monograph would be published by FERF. 
Discussions following  this decision focused  on the means of  developing the 
COSO project in a form  more like that of  a standard setting effort.  The resulting 
public exposure process can be characterized as a standard setting effort;  how-
ever, as COSO has no standard setting authority, whether the results will consti-
tute a standard will depend solely upon the degree of  acceptance this document 
generates. 
The COSO Framework Study 
The COSO Framework is premised on the idea that internal control is essen-
tial to the efficient  and effective  operations of  a business, reliable external 
financial  reporting (note that COSO only went this far  on the topic of  external 
reporting) and compliance with laws and regulations. It is also influenced  by a 
belief  that legislators and regulators have misconceptions about the value of 
internal controls or, at least, about the value of  external reporting on internal 
controls. The concern with legislators and regulators explains some of  the posi-
tions adopted by COSO. 
Serious questions arise as to the importance of  internal controls and reporting 
on internal controls. First, is internal control necessary to meet the operations, 
reporting and compliance objectives of  a firm?  If  we can rely on even the sim-
plest biological analogies to the marketplace, survival of  the fittest,  we can pret-
ty well accept that internal control is important to the management of  a firm.  As 
a corollary, we can assume that some form  of  internal reporting will take place 
on this topic. Virtually all successful  firms  commit some fraction  of  their 
resources to development, maintenance, and reporting on internal control sys-
tems. A virtually unqualified  "yes" seems to be appropriate with respect to this 
point. How much firms  commit is, at this time, based on a firm  by firm 
cost/benefit  analysis, taking into consideration current mandated regulations. 
Less obvious is the answer to the second question: Is external reporting on inter-
nal control useful?  There is little empirical evidence to support the demand for 
external reports on internal controls other than from  legislative and regulatory 
bodies. Winters and Guy [1992, p. 183] contend that "Those who advocate 
reports on internal control usually cite two major benefits...a  behavioral 
effect...[and  an] information  content [benefit]." 
The COSO Framework is composed of  four  separate volumes: Executive 
Summary; Framework Study; Management Reporting to External Parties; and 
Tools. This structure seems quite obvious with the possible exception of  the 
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separation of  the Management Reporting to External Parties from  the 
Framework Study. The separation is the result of  COSO advisory members' 
deliberations on the topic of  external reporting and significant  contradictory 
commentary on the same topic from  those receiving the exposure draft.  The 
contradictory commentary, disagreements and concerns are, in my opinion, 
reflected  in the final  document in a number of  ways: external reporting is not 
required for  good internal control; only external financial  reporting is addressed 
in any substantive and explicit way by the report; and external auditing is not 
given much explicit prominence in any of  the volumes. This latter point may 
reflect  management's concern for  expanding audit fees  and a general feeling 
that the audit adds little value in the circumstances addressed by the report. The 
public accounting participants in the process would undoubtedly not accept the 
lack of  value added position; however, concern for  extended legal exposure, a 
desire to make progress on a common set of  definitions  and criteria and the 
inclusion of  a volume specifically  addressing external reporting issues may 
influence  them to accept the report. 
Summary of  the COSO Documents 
The following  comments are based on the COSO report, Internal  Control-
Integrated  Framework,  Committee of  Sponsoring Organizations of  the 
Treadway Commission, Revised Draft,  February 1992, revised based on recom-
mendations of  the April 13, 1992 COSO Advisory Committee meeting [COSO, 
1992]. Subsequent changes are reflected  where they are known to be part of  the 
planned revisions. 
Throughout this paper I have drawn very heavily (in fact,  as much as possi-
ble) on the actual words used in the COSO documents. I have not used quota-
tion marks or page references,  as they would be distracting. However, subject to 
my errors in transcription or subsequent COSO changes, statements attributed to 
COSO use COSO's words. As you will have noted above, I have also drawn 
from  SAS 55 and the Winters and Guy paper [AICPA, 1988; COSO, 1992; 
Winters and Guy, 1992], In these cases, I have endeavored to use page and 
paragraph references  as well as quotation marks. These quotations and observa-
tions are inserted at the points where they seem to bear on the COSO volumes 
discussed. I have endeavored to clearly distinguish my opinions, which are mine 
alone. 
a. Objectives of  Framework  Study:  COSO established two objectives for  its 
integrated framework  study, (emphasis added) to: 
• Establish a common definition  serving the needs of  different  parties. 
• Provide a standard  against which business and other entities—large or 
small, in the public or private sector, for  profit  or not—can assess their 
control systems and determine to improve them. 
b. Success in meeting these objectives requires: 
• A common and generally accepted definition  of  internal control. 
• A generally accepted set of  standards  for  assessing whether an organi-
zation's  internal  control  system meets effectiveness  standards. 
The COSO document does present a definition  and standards, but it is too 
early to know whether either will be accepted as the common definition  and 
standards for  internal control. There was certainly a good deal of  discussion 
about the definition  and standards among all parties to the process. Many of  the 
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exposure draft  comments have been incorporated into the definition  and stan-
dards. These comments were incorporated, both to improve the definition  and 
standards and also in an attempt to assure the general acceptance necessary to 
meet the COSO study objectives. Without additional exposure efforts,  one 
could expect continuing dissatisfaction  with specific  aspects of  the definition. 
Some of  these disagreements would clearly be a matter of  editorial choices, e.g., 
where the wording is not that used by a particular organization in its current lit-
erature. These disagreements are unlikely to persist if  the COSO framework 
gains any significant  degree of  prominence. Other matters may prove more sub-
stantive but will have to await attempts to apply the COSO framework  in the 
field  to existing and newly arising problems, e.g., external compliance reporting 
in the banking industry. Disagreements about the breadth or narrowness of  the 
definition  and standards (both exist) are unlikely to be resolved at this late date. 
The broader definition  adopted by COSO had the predominant level of  support 
from  both COSO participants and those responding to the report drafts. 
It is too early to know whether the COSO framework  will become the stan-
dard of  application. However, there are forces  that encourage its adoption. The 
Congress and its regulatory arms may find  it a useful  point of  departure when 
considering new legislation or regulation in the internal control reporting arena. 
There are already indications that at least part of  the COSO document will be 
included in pending regulations. The private sector participants clearly hope for 
such reliance and for  an understanding on the part of  the lawmakers that the 
COSO framework  also addresses the limits of  lawmaker requests. Some private 
sector participants hope that it will act as a brake on regulators' desires for  addi-
tional mandated public reporting and auditing. At the same time, the public 
accounting sector may find  that the COSO framework  provides them with a 
ready marketing tool. However, while there are incentive compatible reasons to 
expect acceptance by many of  the principals involved, this acceptance is only 
likely to be retained among the participants based on early successes or failures 
in application. Winters and Guy say [p. 180]: 
Agreement about what internal control is...may be attainable. For exam-
ple, regulatory agencies...have indicated they will adopt the COSO report 
as the standard against which both the required management and auditor 
assessments of  internal control effectiveness...should  be judged...imbuing 
the COSO report with 'general acceptance'.... 
More experience implementing the COSO report is needed...before  its 
success can be evaluated.... 
Realistically, I believe that the COSO framework  will become an integral 
part of  the internal control literature for  the next five  to ten years. During that 
time events will determine its survival as a seminal work or as a useful  effort 
needing elaboration, extension or revision. In any case, it will have set the agen-
da for  consideration and action and moved the internal control discussion for-
ward. 
Definition 
COSO defined  internal control [COSO Advisory Committee meeting, 
February 1992; revised based on April 13, 1992] as follows  (emphasis added): 
Internal control is a process, effected  by an entity's board of  directors, 
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management and other personnel, designed  to provide reasonable as-
surance regarding the achievement of  objectives in the following  cate-
gories: 
• Effectiveness  and efficiency  of  operations. 
• Reliability of  external  financial  reporting. 
• Compliance  with applicable laws and regulations. 
According to SAS 55, Para 6: 
An entity's internal control structure consists of  the policies and proce-
dures established to provide reasonable assurance that specific  entity 
objectives will be achieved. (Note: The SAS focus  of  interest is on those 
parts of  the internal control structure "...relevant to an audit of  the entity's 
financial  statements.") 
The categories of  internal control form  the expanded basis of  the COSO defi-
nition. The explicit incorporation of  operations and compliance categories sub-
stantially expands the usual ASB (Auditing Standard Board) definition.  While 
SAS 55 broadened the definition  of  internal control and eliminated the account-
ing and administrative controls distinction and as a result recognized the impor-
tance of  operations, SAS 55 only addresses the context of  reliable external 
financial  reporting and the planning of  an audit for  that purpose. The COSO 
definition  envisions these categories as important in their own right, perhaps 
even more important than the more limited outlook suggested by the ASB. 
COSO recognizes that there is no sharp line delineating these categories and 
that consideration of  any category will likely involve consideration of  aspects of 
another category. COSO also recognizes that the methods of  measurement 
needed to address these categories are not equally well developed. They do not 
consider the measurement problem to be sufficient  to suggest that the categories 
should be ignored or de-emphasized. Those concerned with the regulators' ap-
parently lesser concern for  the limitation of  measurement in these areas may 
continue to be concerned about the inclusion of  these categories. 
According to Winters and Guy [p. 180-181]: 
... Such a categorization...creates a perception that internal control compo-
nents within these categories are clearly identifiable  and distinguishable 
and that experience and expertise in applying the COSO criteria [see 
Components below] is equally well-developed for  each of  these cate-
gories. 
This perception is not valid and, although the COSO report attempts to 
dispel the inference,  our experience with numerous regulatory requests for 
auditor services on internal control demonstrates that the misperception is 
common.... 
Regulatory initiatives calling for  such implementation are fast  outpacing 
our ability to provide those services.... 
While the broader definition  had the preponderance of  support, some of 
those commenting on the definition  felt  that it was too broad to the point of 
defining  not internal control, but management. Others felt  that it should be nar-
rowed to encompass only financial  statement preparation. There was a good 
deal of  concern that the broad definition  would extend the litigation exposure of 
anyone associated with the design, functioning  or reporting on internal control, 
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and that it would encourage regulators to extend their reach in this area. 
Components 
Integral to the definition  are five  interrelated components. The drafters  of  the 
COSO framework  indicate that these components are derived from  the way 
management runs its business. The definitions  below are drawn from  the related 
chapters in the Framework document. I have, as noted earlier, used the docu-
ment's wording. 
Control  Environment  - Control environment factors  include: the integrity, 
ethical values and competence of  the entity's people; management's philosophy 
and operating style; the way management assigns authority and responsibility 
and organizes and develops its people; and the attention and direction provided 
by the board of  directors. 
Winters and Guy point out [p. 181]: 
Another concern about the COSO criteria is that certain components may 
be so subjective as to not be susceptible to reasonably consistent estima-
tion or measurement. Those components most often  cited include integri-
ty, ethical values and management competence. 
These are actually all a part of  a single component, Control Environment. They 
also say, [p. 185]: 
...[T]he expanded definition  [of  internal control in SAS 55] brought the 
control environment and the accounting system directly into the scope of 
the auditor's consideration. ...[t]hese components are much more closely 
associated with the primary causes of  financial  statement misstatements 
than are control over individual transactions. 
Given the above two statements by Winters and Guy, I am not sure why the first 
comment is offered  as the concepts are already in SAS 55. Do Winters and Guy 
mean that SAS 55 already allows auditors to rely on overly subjective inputs to 
too great a degree? This point has been argued elsewhere by Morton and Felix 
[1991] and Kinney, et. al., [1990]. 
Risk Assessment - Risk assessment involves identification  and analysis of 
relevant risks to achievement of  the objectives as a basis for  determining how 
risk should be managed. 
Winters and Guy comment that [p. 184]: 
...Even more modernistic and intriguing are questions about the meaning 
of  control risk in an audit of  internal control—that is, what does control 
risk mean and how should it be considered when an auditor is engaged to 
express an opinion on the effectiveness  of  internal control over financial 
reporting, compliance, or operations? 
I am unclear as to the uniqueness of  the problem as it applies to financial  report-
ing as this concept seems quite well established, i.e., the probability of  material 
error occurring and not being identified  and corrected by the control system. 
With respect to operations and compliance, the problem relates to the material-
ity measurement concept discussed elsewhere and the definition  of  error. In 
both of  these cases, Winters and Guy have a point. 
Control  Activities  - Control activities are policies and procedures (which are 
the actions of  people to implement the policies) to help ensure that management 
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directives identified  as necessary to address risks are carried out. Control activi-
ties can be divided into three categories, based on the nature of  the entity's 
objectives to which they relate: operations; financial  information  reporting; or 
compliance. 
Information  and Communication  - Pertinent information  must be identified, 
captured and communicated to people in a form  and timeframe  that enables 
them to carry out their responsibilities. Information  systems produce the reports 
containing operational, financial  and compliance-related information  that make 
it possible to run and control the business. They deal not only with internally 
generated data, but also with information  about external events, activities, and 
conditions necessary to informed  business decision making and external report-
ing. 
Monitoring  - Internal control systems need to be monitored — a process that 
assesses the quality of  the system's performance  over time. This is accom-
plished through ongoing monitoring activities, separate evaluations, or a combi-
nation of  the two. 
The tests of  controls discussion in Chapter 6, Monitoring, implies that the 
"actual functioning"  of  a system can be established by discussion with person-
nel. This is recognized to be a weak statement of  the evidence required to estab-
lish "actual" functioning  and likely to be a satisfactory  approach in only rare 
circumstances. In my opinion, it allows too much evidential weight on dis-
cussion with personnel. 
SAS 55, Para 51 states: "Inquiry alone generally will not provide sufficient 
evidential matter to support a conclusion about the effectiveness  of  design or 
operation of  a specific  control procedure." The use of  the word "generally" is, 
in my opinion, a weak statement similar to that in the COSO report. Also, SAS 
55, Para 8 says: 
For purposes of  an audit of  financial  statements, an entity's internal con-
trol structure consists of  the three following  elements: The control envi-
ronment; The accounting system; and Control procedures. 
Note that, from  above, it would appear that the SAS and COSO Control en-
vironments are pretty much the same. However, the SAS Accounting system 
and Control procedures appear to be included primarily in the COSO Control 
activities. Clearly, the SAS envisions Risk Assessment, Information  and 
Communication and Monitoring as part of  internal control. This is seen in SAS 
55, Para 29: "Control risk should be assessed in terms of  financial  statement 
assertions." 
The original exposure draft  of  the framework  included a larger number of 
components. Based on exposure draft  responses, several new aspects of  internal 
control were added to the components and the components were reduced in 
number. It would appear that COSO has incorporated virtually all of  the expo-
sure draft  commentary in this area. Remaining debate seems to be focused  more 
on presentation and integration within the model. Those who feel  that the com-
ponents should be incorporated directly into the definition  in order to produce, 
in their view, a more complete stand alone definition  will be disappointed. 
All components apply to all categories and are, in that sense, an integral part 
of  the definition  of  internal controls. 
The Framework takes the position that all components must be present to 
have an effective  internal control system in each of  the category areas. It is rec-
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ognized that some trade-off  may exist as to the strength of  one component ver-
sus another and still have an effective  internal control system, but all compo-
nents must be present. It is hard to imagine an entity that is devoid of  some as-
pect of  each of  these components. 
Effectiveness 
Internal control can be judged effective  in each of  the three categories, 
respectively, if  the board of  directors and management have reasonable assur-
ance that (emphasis added): 
• They understand the extent to which the entity's operations objectives 
are being achieved. 
• Financial  reports  are being prepared reliably. 
• Applicable laws and regulations are being complied  with. 
Commentary on this aspect of  the study tended to concentrate on the mean-
ing of  reasonable assurance as it applied to the reliability and compliance cate-
gories. Those with a legal background tended to be concerned because of  the 
meanings applied to these terms in the law. COSO decided to continue with 
these commonly used terms and to rely on explanatory materials to make their 
meanings, in this context, clear. Some expressed concern about the focus  on 
boards and management assurance as opposed to third party assurances. As 
third party assurances come only with external reporting, COSO decided to 
address that issue only where third party reporting was discussed, i.e., external 
financial  reporting. 
As stated in SAS 55, Para 17: 
Whether an internal control structure policy or procedure has been placed 
in operation is different  from  its operating effectiveness...This  Statement 
does not require the auditor to obtain knowledge about operating effec-
tiveness as part of  the understanding of  the internal control structure. 
Further in Para 29, SAS 55 states that: 
Assessing control risk is the process of  evaluating the effectiveness  of  an 
entity's internal control structure policies and procedures in preventing or 
detecting material misstatements in the financial  statements. 
OPERATION COMPLIANCE 
EXTERNAL 
REPORTING 
CONTROL 
ENVIRONMENT 
RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
CONTROL 
ACTIVITIES 
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION 
MONITORING 
199 
Internal Control Model - Categories And Components 
While not presented in the currently revised document, an internal control 
model is implicit in the above (the model was developed and presented to the 
COSO Advisory Committee by the drafters  and may appear in a future  draft  of 
the report). I will present a slightly adapted model framework  from  that derived 
directly from  the above and discuss its relationship to the current COSO 
Framework document. 
Note that the internal control definition  categories  form  the columns of  the 
matrix and the five  components the rows. In the current document the column 
labeled above as "External Reporting" is labeled "Reliability of  financial  report-
ing." I have used the more general, "External Reporting" because I believe that 
it provides a more internally consistent model and allows for  all forms  of  exter-
nal reporting. There may be a bit of  confusion  about my apparent switch to 
"external" reporting as a header in that the definition  does not include the word 
"external" in the financial  reporting category. Thus, the financial  reporting cate-
gory refers  to all financial  reporting, internal and external. However, other 
forms  of  internal and external reporting considered by COSO are a part of  the 
information  and communications component. Treating the financial  reporting 
category as primarily a concern for  external reports seems, to me, more appro-
priate and consistent for  model purposes. It also seems appropriate to do so 
because of  the external reporting emphasis given this category in the separate 
volume on the matter. The following  discussion as it relates to financial  re-
porting has an external reporting orientation. 
Winters and Guy believe that "[I]nternal control theory and applications have 
progressed,...." [p. 177] It is not clear to me that we have made much progress 
to a normative theory of  internal control beyond general control theory as 
appearing in the industrial engineering literature. We do have some conceptual 
models, such as the one above, that form  the basis for  developing criteria for 
internal control. These are descriptive theories of  internal control derived large-
ly from  the observation of  practice. 
The rationale behind the three categories can be developed along several dif-
ferent  lines of  thought. When approaching it from  the COSO Framework writ-
ers' point of  view, the three categories are considered in terms of  an entity's 
conditions for  continued economic existence and success. The operations cate-
gory represents the need to transform  inputs into outputs in an economic man-
ner that will satisfy  the customer's needs. The compliance category may be 
viewed as meeting the essential restrictions placed on an entity by various sanc-
tioned governmental and voluntary external entities. Where inability to supply 
the customer market will result in failure  through competitive market forces, 
lack of  compliance with critical laws and regulations can result in entity failure 
even when some parts of  the market are clamoring for  the product. External 
reporting may be required under a variety of  circumstances. The one most obvi-
ously envisioned by the current COSO document and present practice is exter-
nal financial  reporting. In a financial  market environment like our own, obtain-
ing the necessary capital to permit continuing operations requires com-
munications with external capital providers. Others may also use external finan-
cial reports for  purposes such as credit setting, contract negotiations, etc., and 
these are envisioned by COSO as well. The broader category I have used, 
"External Reporting," also envisions external reporting not currently considered 
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commonplace, e.g., external reports to bank regulators, external reports of  com-
pliance with environmental laws and regulations, etc. The COSO Framework 
document considers that external reports other than external financial  reports 
reside in either the operating or compliance categories of  the definition  through 
the component "Information  and Communication." They also believe that the 
inclusion of  only the more limited external financial  reporting category will bet-
ter retain and highlight the link to the separate volume on external financial 
reporting. Thus while the COSO form  of  the model allows for  other than finan-
cial external reports, it does so only indirectly. 
The above comments address materials embodied in Chapter 1 of  the COSO 
Framework document. The balance of  the COSO statement is an elaboration on 
the above definition,  components and effectiveness  statement. Five additional 
chapters are devoted (one each) to the five  components, a sixth chapter to limi-
tations of  internal controls and a final  chapter to the roles and responsibilities of 
the various parties within an entity. 
Management Reporting to External Parties 
This section deals only with external financial  reporting. The issues of  exter-
nal reporting on operations and compliance are not dealt with by the COSO 
Framework. 
There is a major discontinuity between the process orientation of  the 
Framework document and the state orientation adopted in this volume. The 
Framework's definition  of  internal control as a process seems to be appropriate 
and creates no problem until we encounter reporting issues. In that context, two 
problems arise. First, there is the matter of  the current level of  technology and 
cost of  auditing a process. This problem exists for  both internal and external 
reports, but is probably most significant  for  external reports where an audit 
might be considered. Second, particularly in an external report, the degree of 
exposure when expressing an opinion on the continuing operation of  a process 
is perceived to be more extensive than expressing an opinion on the point-in-
time state of  a system. There can be little argument that as no actions actually 
occur at a point-in-time, more exposure with respect to actions exists if  one 
expresses an opinion covering a period of  actual system operation. These issues 
become evident in the external reporting volume where point-in-time reporting 
is selected, i.e., a report on a state of  the process but not the process itself. 
The volume indicates that users may be most interested in whether the sys-
tem was functioning  and will function  in the future.  However, the volume also 
indicates that management and/or auditors cannot provide much evidence on 
either. With respect to the future,  there can be no question that evidence is not 
obtainable; with respect to the past, the evidence is obtainable. However, in the 
context of  this volume, even if  obtained and indicative of  a material weakness, 
it would be reported only if  management had not corrected and tested the 
change. 
Winters and Guy [pp. 186-188] argue that the behavioral and information 
content benefits  of  reporting on internal controls do not flow  to external finan-
cial reporting because if  a material error occurs, it can be corrected and the 
external financial  reports will be reliable; this may miss the point or simply be a 
matter of  definition.  They are certainly correct that the final  product of  the suc-
cessful  audit will be reliable financial  statements even if  the internal control 
system did not produce them as desired. However, in the interim, the failure  of 
201 
an internal control system to produce such statements may be costly in terms of 
decisions made with faulty  information  or losses incurred through resource dis-
sipation. Perhaps the poor decision and resource loss issues are really an opera-
tions issue. This is the position of  the COSO Framework. Nevertheless, I do not 
agree with the statement by Winters and Guy [p. 188] that "... for  the financial 
reporting category, the argument boils down to which type of  information  is 
least costly to provide." Reports on internal control provide different  informa-
tion about the firm  than the output contained in the financial  statements. It 
remains an empirical issue as to whether this different  information  is worth the 
cost of  production. I see the internal control reporting on financial  issues in 
pretty much the same light as that on operations and compliance. In all three 
areas internal reports are provided to management; in all three areas there is dif-
ferent  information  than would be provided by an output report only. In all three 
areas there are, internally, actions that can be taken to create a more effective 
and efficient  environment; in all three areas, externally, there is very little 
empirical evidence as to the demand for  reports on these matters. In all three 
areas, a conceptual argument can be made that the information  would provide 
another means of  evaluating management performance  and thus in making deci-
sions on retention and rewards for  management. I would agree with Winters and 
Guy [p. 189] that "In our view, not much progress has been made in resolving 
the questions concerning the relative merits of  reports on internal control versus 
reports on output," although I do not see it as a versus issue. 
Unfortunately,  whether by intent or not, and as noted by Winters and Guy, 
the COSO report reads like an attempt to avoid ever having to report a material 
weakness: 
Another peril arises because the report uses the concept of  a material 
weakness to separate effective  from  ineffective  internal control. Using this 
measure causes two problems. First, no conceptual or empirical construct 
of  a material weakness exists for  either internal control over compliance or 
operations.... In the absence of  sound definitions...such  evaluations will be 
subject to extreme variations in consistency and usefulness. 
Even though an accepted material weakness concept exists for  internal 
control over financial  reporting, it also poses complications. There are 
strong disincentives to concluding that such weaknesses exist. [pp. 181] 
...If  the concept of  material weaknesses, as prescribed in both the COSO 
report and the proposed attestation standard, results in the virtual absence 
of  material weaknesses..., all reports will look alike. These boilerplate 
reports are not likely to have much information  content and, instead, serve 
only as a basis for  litigation.... [p. 190] 
The position adopted on reporting material weaknesses is supported as a con-
structive focus  designed to encourage monitoring and correction throughout the 
period. Admittedly, it does encourage correction and "testing" on a "timely" 
basis. However, it assumes very little value in the disclosures exercise, but pro-
vides no evidence to support that view. Winters and Guy assert that [p. 189]: 
...We believe...that internal control reports are much more useful  for 
these [specified]  parties than for  the general public, and less likely to cre-
ate perils for  management and their auditors. 
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Reports to the general public are much more hazardous than those to 
specific  users; hazardous to the public, the entity, and its auditors.... At 
most members of  the investing public might alter their investment 
decisions.... 
The reasons given by them are the usual "it will confuse  the public" statements. 
The COSO document asserts that external reporting is not an element of 
internal control, but provides no evidence that such reports do not contribute to 
internal control. The document also asserts that point-in-time reporting is, in 
general, most appropriate, but offers  no evidence. Further, the document specif-
ically asserts that point-in-time reporting meets the needs of  security holders 
and other external parties, but provides no evidence. 
The discussion concerning interim reporting reduces, in my opinion, to 
reporting on system design for  interim reporting, a point of  view rejected when 
discussing the need to report on effectiveness.  This is perhaps a bit too harsh a 
judgment, but it definitely  reads as an attempt to avoid reporting any material 
weaknesses. 
Conclusions 
What can we expect the debate over internal controls to be like during the 
coming years? First, the debate over the definition  of  internal control is not 
over. Despite COSO's valiant attempt, the lack of  a theory of  internal control 
beyond that found  in engineering control theory assures that the debate will 
continue. COSO has provided one model with its categories and components of 
internal control. Like many other models, it does not derive from  some funda-
mental postulates but rather from  a studied consideration of  what occurs in the 
business environment. This does not make these models useless. In fact,  the 
very lack of  a theory makes them particularly important for  the improvement of 
practice as well as for  their potential contribution to the eventual creation of  a 
more fundamental  theory. 
Second, there are even more pragmatic reasons to expect the debate to con-
tinue. While the COSO report will gain acceptance as a point of  departure when 
considering internal control issues, there will be debate over the details whenev-
er there is a disagreement among participants as to the desirability of  some 
action bearing on internal controls. For example, a regulator under pressure to 
accomplish some goal, such as the perceived protection of  the general public, 
may come to believe that a report by management, attested to be the auditor's, 
will serve to create that protection. Whether the regulator is correct or has more 
than political support for  the position may be of  less consequence than the need 
to take action. 
This is already evident in the recent banking regulation requirements for 
reporting on compliance with laws and regulations. Adherents to the COSO 
report may arrive at differing  positions on the desirability of  this particular 
action. Those who desire to have such reports could take the position that 
COSO addressed the standards for  such reports, even though they provided 
some cautions and no example reports. Others might believe that COSO was 
more than cautionary in its concern for  the expansion of  external reporting in 
this area and that, in fact,  COSO would not support the extension of  external 
reporting in this area. Whatever the "facts"  in this particular case, it would 
appear that the regulations will stand and that the debate will move in the direc-
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tion of  limiting the laws and regulations to which the opinion will apply, speci-
fying  the detailed attestation work necessary and attempting to specify  and limit 
the risk exposure to the auditor, i.e., in large part dealing with those details of 
measurement and risk not addressed by COSO in the area of  external reporting 
on compliance with laws and regulations. 
As there are already many other such reports being prepared for  internal or 
limited use (for  example, on environmental control matters), we might expect to 
see a series of  proposals for  additional public disclosures. We can all think of 
public interest groups that may find  it worthwhile to push for  such action. 
The internal control debate is only one of  many areas where the profession's 
exposure has increased in recent years. There is little doubt that the profession 
has had a long standing role with respect to the evaluation of  internal controls. 
However, since the enactment of  the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practice Act), the 
nature of  that role has been expanding. FCPA opened up avenues for  increased 
service to clients in satisfying  the requirements of  that act. At the same time, 
meeting this client service clearly opened up the potential for  auditor attestation 
exposure. For some time the profession  resisted offering  an external attestation 
opinion on internal controls. It now appears that the profession  supports some 
form  of  external attestation report. The argument appears to be that the profes-
sionals are being held liable in any case, so let's do the work and get paid for 
the risk. However, this is only one area of  increased risk in the ever expanding 
client service domain of  the profession. 
As the profession  has moved or been pushed, depending upon your perspec-
tive, from  its traditional franchise  as the auditors of  external financial  reports to 
client service organizations, its practitioners have found  themselves caught in 
the muddy waters of  marketing essentially new services while attempting to 
limit exposure. Unfortunately,  one gets the impression that each service is open-
ing up substantial, unanticipated exposures and that attempting to limit the 
exposure is akin to holding back the tides. I have no solution. Perhaps limited 
liability corporations and tort reform  will help, but I am fearful  that even with 
such reform  the profession  is in danger of  losing its franchise  or being charged 
so high a price for  its franchise  as to lose its business viability. Neither of  these 
results is in our interests or the interests of  the broader society. 
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